

NOV 13 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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SUBJECT: Soviet Analysis of U.S. Capabilities and Intentions

The [] report on intelligence analysis in the Soviet Union is a highly interesting study of the procedures and institutions by which the Soviets make judgments about the outside world. I would be interested to know what we know of the substance of those judgments.

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For example:

-- What do they think is our targeting doctrine? Do they think our Minutemen are targeted on their cities or on their forces?

-- How do their perceptions of our forces and doctrines enter into their own strategic force decisions? Would they see a need to have a MIRV to respond to our ICBM force?

-- What is their current view on the kinds of situations in which we might use nuclear weapons? Do they expect quick use of theater weapons in a war in Europe? Do they see "bargaining" strikes or threats of strikes as a likely device in a confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR?

I realize that our information on questions like this may not be as complete and definitive as our information on some technical questions. On the other hand, the President has often expressed his interest in careful assessments of Soviet reactions to the courses of action he wants to consider. Analytic intelligence on how they view specific substantive areas helps us understand how they might react to future situations.

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pages 1 & 2

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NSS Review Completed.

I would appreciate receiving from you as soon as possible:

1. A paper outlining what we know now about the questions listed above.
2. A report on our present capability to analyze Soviet decision-making, with suggestions for improvements.

(Signed) HENRY A. KISSINGER

Henry A. Kissinger

LELynn/Wslocombe/nb/7 Nov 1969

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ACTION



November 8, 1969

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MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. *YSL*

SUBJECT: Request for More Information from CIA on Soviet
Analysis of U.S. Capabilities and Intentions

General Haig said that after reading the CIA's report on intelligence analysis procedures in the Soviet Union you asked what we know about the substance of their analysis, specifically whether they think our Minutemen are aimed at cities and whether they have MIRVs.

Attached at Tab A is a note to Helms asking for:

-- CIA's current views on those two questions and on their notions of when the U.S. might use nuclear weapons.

-- A report on our present capability to answer questions about the substance of Soviet analysis of U.S. actions and doctrine.

I have included the second part so that CIA will be reminded of your interest in intelligence analysis of Soviet decision-making and doctrine, as well as technical and "factual" reporting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

Enclosure



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